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Athenian fiscal expansionary policy and peace versus war strategy 
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Abstract: In the present essay, we develop at first a model of choice by actors to 
show how a society can take decisions on specific issues according to how flexible or 
rigid it is in new ideas and trends. Then, by utilizing game theory we explain how the 
Athenian society abandoned war in favour of a peace grand strategy during the second 
half of the 4
th
 century BCE. To achieve this, two visionary Athenian policymakers 
Eubulus and Lycurgus introduced fiscal expansionary policy programs which proved 
beneficial for the majority of the citizens. We found that through the expansionary 
public works programs, the Athenian citizens were taking decisions based on rational 
choice according to a wider economic prospective.  
Keywords: model of choice, game theory, fiscal expansionary programs, Late 4
th
 
century BCE Athens.      
JEL Classification: H30 • H53• H56 • N43 • Z13 • Z18 
 
1. Introduction 
The issue of estimating social change  is still  pivotal in research fields such as 
the New Institutional Economics school initiated by North (1978, 1981, 1990) to more 
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recently, the analysis of the emergence of specific macrocultures that are favourable 
to the creation of democratic forms of government (Kyriazis and Economou, 2012, 
2013, 2015).
1
 
In the present paper we argue that during the second half of the fourth century 
BCE a series of fiscal expansionary programs being undertaken by two visionary 
Athenian policymakers, Eubulus and Lycurgus lead Athens out of a serious crisis: an 
economically harmful and unsuccessful war during 357-355 BCE, which was highly 
detrimental because of the loss of both human and capital resources, and because of 
the disorganization which had caused in the Athenian social structure.   
 Firstly, in order to show the variety of options that direct democracy was 
offering to the Athenian citizens, we present a choice set like those that were being 
discussed in each gathering of the Athenian assembly. Next, by examining the issue of 
the selection between peace or war strategy, we utilize game theory in order to show 
that the adoption of new proposals by the Athenian citizens was actually a 
compromise between different social groups and was based on rational choice. We 
found out under which terms the implementation of a peace grand strategy can be 
mutually beneficial to different social groups and under specific terms, against the 
adoption of a war strategy, which may be beneficial only to specific social groups and 
again, under specific terms.         
 We argue that Eubulus and Lycurgus democratically persuaded their co-
citizens to abandon war strategies in favour of peace through a series of vast fiscal 
expansionary policies, which finally not only raised impressively the Athenian state 
revenues, but also became the way through which different social groups benefited by 
increasing their personal welfare and income.  
                                                          
1 We have introduced the concept of macroculture, taken over and adapted from organization theory 
into Institutional Economics in order to analyse structural change. A macroculture encompasses the 
common values, norms and beliefs shared among the members of a society or a state. The adaptation of 
the term in economics and politics has also a dynamic time characteristic, that of long term periods. As 
we have shown by applying the concept to the case of Classical Athens, the elements of macroculture 
take shape over time periods of decades to centuries (Kyriazis and Economou, 2012, 2013a, 2015). 
According to the theory, through these values, norms and beliefs, a macroculture guides actions and 
creates typical behaviour among independent entities, so that it coordinates their activities so that 
complex tasks may be completed (Abrahamson and Fombrun, 1992, 1994; Jones, Hesterly, and 
Borgatti, 1997). 
3 
 
 
2. A model of choice 
Since Kleisthenes reforms started after 508 BCE, Athens gradually developed 
the most advanced system of direct democracy in antiquity under which any citizen, 
called “ho voulomenos” (he, who wishes to make a proposal) could introduce in front 
of the Assembly of citizens, (requiring a quorum of 6000 present) proposals on any 
subject, such as external policy, (war or peace), public choice such as, the famous 
naval law of Themistocles (Kyriazis and Zouboulakis, 2004; Halkos and Kyriazis, 
2010) or monetary currency policy, eg. Nicophon’s monetary law of 376 BCE., on the 
parallel circulation of all good coins and the state's guarantee for their acceptance 
(Engen, 2005; Ober, 2008).
2
  
Under direct democracy citizens have a variety of different options to choose, 
for a variety of different issues. In ancient Athens, which was the first ever recorded 
fully functional direct democracy
3
, citizens aged 30 and above were having the right 
to participate in the city-state’s Assembly of citizens in order to exchange views, listen 
to different proposals by the orators, and decide on a series of vital issues for the 
existence of their state, such as war and peace, economic policy, the appointment of 
generals etc. Direct democracy secured the ultimate principle of the real time 
participation of the Athenian citizens to the shaping of the final outcome as far as key 
issues that had to do with the future of their city were concerned.   
 Thus, the principal-agent problem that our modern representative democracies 
face was practically non-existed in ancient Athens, since citizens had the right of 
participation and decision, with a legally binding effect to the Athenian state’s 
policymakers. It has been estimated that in normal cases, approximately forty times a 
                                                          
2
 A detailed analysis of this working of direct democracy, and the initiator (“ho voulomenos”) as 
enriching the exiting choice set of strategies, is offered by Kyriazis and Karayannis (2011).   
3
 Since the 6
th
 century BCE there was a gradual emergence of a democratic macroculture throughout 
the Hellenic world. Except Athens, many other city-states such as the islands of Chios, and Naxos, and 
furthermore, Megara, Pontoheracleia (in today’s north-west Asia Minor), Cyrene (in today’s Libya), 
Kroton, Akragas and Syracuse (in today’s South Sicily) had established functional democratic regimes 
(Robinson, 2003, p.2; Kyriazis, 2012, p.42). Since the late 5
th
 century BCE, and in a more organized 
form during the 4
th
 and the 3
rd
 centuries, Greek federal states emerged. Some of them, were democratic 
federations such as, the Aetolian and the Achaean ones (see Mackil, 2013; Economou and Kyriazis, 
2013; Economou, Kyriazus and Metaxas, 2014). 
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year, the Athenian citizens had the right to vote in favour or against a policy (a 
proposal) being introduced in the Assembly of citizens.
4
 Thus, these frequent citizen’s 
gatherings in the assembly of citizens could be seen, as “the festivals of democracy” 
since citizens themselves were taking decisions, by keeping their own future in their 
own hands. 
But participation in democratic procedures was not only limited to the 
participation in the Assembly. Citizens, at least some time in their life, also became 
magistrates of the state by being elected by lot to state posts, thus they were becoming 
part of the state’s mechanism. The most famous posts were:  be elected as member of 
the Council of the 500, the so, called vouleutai, and to become a member on the public 
courts as public judges (6000 members), the so called Heliastai. (Hansen, 1999; 
Kyriazis, 2009). There was certainly a bottom-up democracy under such procedures. 
Manville and Ober (2003, pp. 65-66) have argued that this active participation in daily 
state affairs was the main reason for the Athenian success: “citizens as active 
members of the state were undertaking leading positions (in public life)….they were 
becoming better as personalities themselves and more efficient as members of the 
society as a whole”. 
It appears that the Athenian society during the 508-322 BCE period of 
democracy (with its short interruptions), had managed to become “flexible” and 
receptive to change. Furthermore, the Athenian society was an open society, if we use 
a modern interpretation, based on Popper’s (1966) argumentation. Under such a 
perspective our analysis now focuses to a model of choice through direct democracy. 
A set of choices instead of say, just one single policy to be accepted or not, can be 
more easily provided in receptive and open societies such as ancient Athens, in 
comparison with more centralist and rigid types of regimes such as Sparta. 
Under direct democracy every citizen has the right to vote in favour or against 
any proposal brought by any citizen in front of the supreme body of governance of the 
city-state, the Assembly. We postulate that citizens are rational in the sense of 
maximizing their individual welfare. When each citizen votes on particular proposals, 
                                                          
4
 There is a vast bibliography as far as the Athenian democracy is concerned. See among others, 
Hansen (1999), Ober (1997, 1999, 2008), Manville and Ober (2003), Rhodes (2004), Raauflaub, Ober 
and Wallace (2007), Kyriazis (2009, 2012), Halkos and Kyriazis (2010) and Lyttkens (1994, 2013). 
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he chooses the proposal that he expects will maximize his individual welfare. Thus, 
the following function is maximized: 
 
max (S1,S2,….,Sn)                                           (1) 
where S1, S2,.......Sn, are the various strategies in his choice “set”, that he expects to 
maximize his welfare. Since in a direct democracy every vote counts as one, the 
strategy that is finally selected, depends on the possibility that it has finally received 
the majority of votes, eg. 
 
                                (2) 
where is the total number of votes received for each strategy.  
 
Diagram 1 shows that citizens at first have to choose one specific strategy out of the 
three available possibilities, S1, S2, S3. If strategy S2 is chosen at time period 1, to the 
exclusion of strategies S1 and S3, then at time period 2 the strategies S4, S5, S6 and S7 
are provided as options. Again, at time period 2, if S5 is chosen (to the exclusion of S4, 
S6, S7), then at time period 3 strategies S8, S9, S10 and S11 become available, etc. Thus, 
the more strategies being introduced, the more flexible and receptive to change is a 
socio-political system.  
 
Diagram 1: Decision probabilities and the adoption of new strategies 
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3. Choosing between war and peace: A game theoretical approach 
In this section we argue that under specific terms, a flexible and receptive to 
change society such as the Athenian one can abandon a specific grand strategy, in our 
cases war, in favour of peace. 
Table 1 presents a game theory matrix which estimates the payoffs of three 
Athenian citizens: Two poor thetes, who were low income citizens who serve as 
rowers in the navy, in the trireme warships, and a trierarch,
5
 a rich one, a commander 
of a trireme warship. There are two options in the game: war (w) and peace (p) 
strategy. Each of the three players chooses the one that maximizes his welfare in the 
game calculated for simplicity as material payoffs.      
 Let us assume (which will be explained in the next section) that for the two 
poor citizens, for whom we make the hypothesis that they have the same preferences, 
the war strategy maximizes their payoffs, while for the rich one, the peace strategy 
does so. Both the low income thetes maximize their payoff by receiving 4 each one, 
during the war period, since they are hired as rowers in the navy and thus, they 
receive a regular wage. In case of peace, there is a great possibility that the poor thetes 
will remain unemployed, since the navy does not need them anymore. We make the 
hypothesis that they sporadically find a job elsewhere, in peaceful activities in Athens, 
thus, in that case they both receive as a payoff, 2.  
On the other hand, the wealthy man maximizes his payoff by receiving 12. 
Such a prospect can be achieved when there is a peace period, since we make the 
hypothesis that the wealthy man is a merchant and commerce can only flourish during 
normal periods, where no barriers because of the war can arise. However, in case of a 
war the situation radically alters for the rich: We assume that there is a great 
                                                          
5
 The Athenian democracy had introduced the institution of liturgies according to which, wealthy 
Athenians were “obliged” to undertake the financing of some institutions such as, theorika, which were 
related to payment of some kind of remuneration, usually one drachma per day, to poorer Athenian 
citizens as compensation for working time lost, to enable them to see the four-day long enactment of 
theatrical plays. The most important and onerous liturgy was the trierarchy under which a single 
wealthy citizen and later on a group of wealthy citizens (under the system of symmoriae) undertook the 
running costs for a single trireme, at the same time offering the services of overseeing it and captaining 
the ship (Hansen, 1999; Kyriazis, 2009, pp. 118-119). Trierarchy was very costly. It was amounting at 
about 3000 to 6000 thousand drachmas (Gabrielsen, 1994; Kaiser, 2007). Lyttkens (1997) argues that 
wealthy citizens willingly decided to finance trierarchy because it was a way of increasing their 
personal prestige in the Athenian political arena.  
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possibility that due to the war, the rich will not only fail to undertake effective 
commercial action, but also that he might suffer a loss thus, a negative payoff 
outcome, say -2, such as a partial or a total destruction of his commercial 
infrastructure and trierarchy costs etc. 
Since every citizen has one vote, the war strategy which is selected by the two 
poor ones is finally chosen due to the majority rule. The outcome of the game is given 
by table 1 below. Since the payoff for each of the two poor players under the war 
strategy is 4, while under the peace strategy is 2, they choose the war strategy, even 
though this brings about a pure loss for the rich. The “value” of the game is 6 in the 
case of the war strategy (adding up the payoffs of the three players) which is lower 
than the “value” of the game under the peace strategy, which is 12. What we purport 
to show in this simple game is that inferior outcomes (strategies) such as war, may be 
chosen under democratic voting, if no compensatory payments, “logrolling” or 
balancing out of interests as Buchanan and Tullock (2004) would have argued, can be 
offered as an alternative option to the citizen-voters. 
 
 
Table 1: Game matrix for a choice without compensatory payments 
 Strategies 
  Peace War 
Players 
1 (poor) 2 4 
2 (poor) 2 4 
             3 (rich) 8 -2 
“Value” of the outcome:  12 6 
 
The situation for the two poor citizens in the first game, which provides the 
outcome without compensatory payments was: 
 
payoff (war) > payoff (peace)                                           (3) 
 
and for the rich: 
 
payoff (war) < payoff (peace)                                           (4) 
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Let us know introduce the possibility of compensatory payments by the rich to 
the two poor players. In the second game which is described below, the rich citizen 
offers compensation to the two poor voters, if they vote for peace instead of war. In 
the new game matrix (table 2), the peace strategy can be adopted, if the following 
conditions are met: 
 
For the poor: 
payoff (peace, with compensation) ≥ payoff (war)                (5) 
 
and for the rich: 
 
payoff (peace, subtracting compensation) > payoff (war)     (6) 
 
In game matrix 2 compensatory accounts are given within the parenthesis in 
each row of the peace strategy: Each poor voter receives (+2) from the rich one, so 
that he is as well off from a payoff situation point under the peace strategy as he was 
under the war strategy (condition 5). The rich voter offers a total of 4 as compensation 
to the two poor voters to vote for peace, out of his total payoffs of 12 - 4 = 8. As table 
2 presents, the “value” of the game is now again 12.   
 
Table 2: Game matrix for a choice with compensation payments 
 Strategies 
  Peace War 
Players 
1 (poor) 2 (+2) = 4 4 
2 (poor) 2 (+2) = 4 4 
          3 (rich)  8+ (- 4) = 4 -2 
“Value” of the outcome:  12  6 
 
 
But the important point of the second game is that once compensatory 
payments are introduced, the possibility of achieving Pareto improving situation is 
given. In the outcome of the second game, the rich player has improved his situation 
(from -2 to 4) so that it is Pareto efficient, while the two poor ones are no worse. Of 
course, through bargaining, the two poor voters could convince the rich one to give 
9 
 
them a somewhat higher compensation, (say 2,5 to each). In this case, they would also 
be better off. Conditions (5) and (6) are thus a minimal condition. 
It is also clear, that the second game is not a zero outcome game (where the 
gains of one, equal the losses of the other(s) players) but a positive sum game. 
Everyone gains, since the total “value” of the game is higher than in the previous 
game matrix 1. As we will show, Eubulus and Lycurgus fiscal policy programs can be 
analysed as programs with compensatory payments by the rich to the poor in order to 
bring about a change of strategy, from war to peace. 
 
4. The implementation of fiscal expansionary policies in the 4th century BCE 
Athens 
At the beginning of the 4
th
 century BCE, Athens attempted to reconstruct the 
Athenian League which had been abolished after Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian 
War. This second Delian League was successful for some years, so long as some city-
states felt threatened by Spartan power and thus needed Athens’ protection. However, 
since the sudden decline of Sparta after its army was defeated in two decisive battles 
by the Thebans (at Leuctra in 371 and at Mantinea in 362 BCE), many allies 
considered Athenian protection not necessary anymore and wanted to get rid of the 
burden of payments to the Athenian war treasury linked to this. 
This reluctance of the allies of Athens to contribute to the war treasury led to 
the so called Social War (circa 357-355 BCE). Athens tried to prevent them from 
breaking away but finally, without success. However, due to the war, Athenian public 
revenues were falling to 140 talents per year (due in part to much lower custom duties 
from trade, since war inhibited trade) whereas expenditure soared. Despite the fact 
that state was in a situation of an economic recession, the majority of the poor 
Athenian citizens still voted for the continuation of the war, because many of them 
had found a stable and not very dangerous employment as rowers in the fleet, which 
during wartimes comprised between 50 to 100 ships, giving employment from 8.500 
to 15.000 rowers.
6
          
 In other words, being employed as a rower in the triremes could mean that at 
least one fourth to half of the active population of Athens could find a job in the navy, 
                                                          
6
 Each trireme employed 170 rowers and of a total complement of 200. See Morrison and Coates 
(1986).  
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as the total population of Athens is estimated to have been approximately 30.000 
people in the 4
th
 century BCE (Hansen, 1999). The fact that employment in the 
Athenian navy even during wartime was relatively safe may sound strange, but during 
the 4
th
 century, it was so. After the victorious battle of Naxos in 376 BC., the 
Athenian navy had reestablished its supremacy for the next half century, till its final 
defeat in the battle of Amorgos in 322 BCE by the Macedonian fleet. During this 
period the Athenian navy fought a series of skirmishes but no major losses and human 
casualties occurred as against, in comparison to those of the Peloponnesian War.
7
 
 What is important to mention, is the fact that the intervention of Athens in a 
series of war campaigns during the 5
th
 and 4
th
 centuries BCE had gradually unveiled a 
situation of opposing interests between the low income class citizens, the thetes on the 
one side, and middle-class hoplite,
8
 Athenians who could not cultivate their farms 
when being absent in foreign expedition as well as rich Athenians, who were losing 
revenues from a reduction of trade, banking, exports and being burdened by liturgies 
such as trierarchy on the other side. To solve this harmful situation Eubulus, the 
leading orator and politician of the 350’s proposed a compromise between the 
different interest groups.       
 Instead of continuing the war strategy, poor citizens (the thetes) could choose 
peace (to the benefit of the rich and the middle classes). In this case, they would 
receive theorika payments. Theorika was a compensation in favour of citizens in order 
to attend public festivals, sacrifices, and public entertainments of various kinds. They 
also functioned as a redistribution relief package in favour of the citizens when in 
need. Thus, in our case they functioned as a reimbursement for the loss of low income 
thetes wages. 
In addition thetes now had the opportunity to work in an extensive public 
works program held by the state in order to beautify the city, as a part of Eubulus 
project of rebuilding Athens strength through internal means.  Eubulus introduced a 
                                                          
7
 For estimates of the cost of war see Pritchard (2011) and Arvanitides and Kyriazis (2012).   
8
 Hoplites were a middle income class citizen group, who were responsible to bear arms (by financing 
their military equipment by themselves) when needed, to defend their city-states. Hoplites were present 
throughout the Greek world, since at least the early 8
th
 century BCE, to the end of the Greek 
independence by the Romans in 146 BCE. For the emergence of the hoplites and their organisation, see 
modern interpretations, among others Hanson (2009), Kyriazis (2012, 2014), Kagan and Viggiano 
(2013), Lyttkens (2013) and Pritchard (2013).  
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law making it difficult to use the surplus of the public finances for military operations, 
which ensured that it would be available only for the public works. Those works 
included among others, a newly made network of roads, water supply of the city, new 
waterfronts and shipyards. ¾ of the warships were redeployed in the newly build ports 
in Zea and Mounichia so that more space would become available in the central port 
of Piraeus for merchant ships. Eubulus also improved the legislation when it comes to 
the commercial law (Sakellariou, 1972, pp. 40-41).      
 Financing increased theorika payments became feasible through the 
implementation of the pentekoste, through which 2% of the sums on the value of 
exports and imports were collected as a custom duty by the state. Furthermore, due to 
an increase in trade, and finally, due to more intensive exploitation of the state’s 
property such as the Laureion silver mines. Eubulus also proposed that the eisphora, a 
tax on property paid by the rich during wartime should become permanent including 
the peaceful era, as an additional source of revenue for the state’s budget, out of 
which eklesiastika (payment for the poor so that they would attend the Assembly), 
theorika, and the public building program could be financed (Kyriazis, 2009).  
It is obvious that all these institutional settlements played the compensatory 
role which has already been described by the second game matrix above. The 
compensatory measures under a peace situation made the poor at least as well off, as 
during the war period. The compromise between reach and poor was successful. 
Thetes were less in favour of war having in mind that extra war expenses would 
absorb the surplus of the theorika, intended otherwise for them as compensation. On 
the other hand, the rich would not anymore be overburdened with war expenses, and 
loss of income.         
 Also, through the compensatory system of theorika the danger of a possible 
social unrest that may have been caused by the dissatisfied lower income classes and 
may have turned into a revolt against the rich and their wealth, gradually faded away. 
The fact that the theorika payments safeguarded the cohesion of the Athenian society 
and the survival of the political regime, made the Athenian orator and politician 
Demades, an important figure of that period to characterize all these compensatory 
system from the rich to the poor citizens, as “the glue of democracy” (Plut. Mor. 
1016B; Sakellariou, 1972, pp. 40-41). 
The expansionary fiscal policy program that introduced by Eubulus lasted up 
to 340 BCE. It is believed that Eubulus died at the same year. During the 355-340 
12 
 
BCE period state revenues increased from 130 talents to 400 talents, almost four times 
higher than the year 355. The grand strategy of the Athenian state which was based on 
reaping the rewards of peace, through the impressive increase in international trade 
and social reconciliation was abandoned only when the geopolitical expansionism of 
Macedonia under king Philip become extremely difficult to be ignored while in the 
meantime, the belligerent passionate speeches of Demosthenes were adding fuel to the 
fire in favour of the war.
9
 
After the battle of Chaeronea which took place in 338 BCE, were the coalition 
armies from Athens, Thebes and their allies was defeated by the Macedonians, 
Lycurgus, another Athenian statesman and orator implemented another similar fiscal 
expansionary project. Lycurgus plan brought the brightest and longest period of peace 
in the history of the Athenian democracy, which lasted to 322 BCE (Lycurgus died in 
323 BCE, the same year as Alexander the Great). By the mid of 330’s BCE public 
revenues had been increased to 1200 talents per year (Amemiya, 2007; Ober, 2008; 
Kyriazis and Economou, 2013b). 
Lycurgus political program was highly successful for a variety of reasons: 
Firstly, Lycurgus program guaranteed stable employment and revenues for the 
majority of the poorer Athenians in a series of public work programs. Being inspired 
by his mentor Eubulus, Lycurgus launched a vast public works program, second only 
to that of Pericles, which may be interpreted, in modern terms, as an expansionary 
fiscal policy program of Keynesian inspiration. The public works program included 
the new sewage system for Piraeus, monuments such as the theatre of Dionysius 
beneath the Acropolis, and the extension of the Pnyx, the place where the assembly of 
citizens was taking place (Hansen, 1999; Kyriazis, 2009).    
 Other monuments were also built including a prominent water clock, the 
Lyceum, the Telesterion at Eleusis
10
, as well as the construction of local theaters in 
                                                          
9
 That the Macedonian threat was real was realized by almost every Athenian, when king Philip seized 
in a surprise move, a fleet of 240 Athenian merchant ships carrying grain. Athenian population was 
dependent on the imports of cereals, since the Greco-Persian war era (490-470 BCE) and even earlier, 
since it was not self-sufficient in grain products. See Green (1998). 
10
 Lyceum like the Academy and the Kynosarges were extensive athletic facilities, where every citizen, 
without socioeconomic discriminations could receive training and exercise themselves in all kinds of 
sports. This institution was financed by the state and gradually expanded during the fifth century 
providing they were not slaves. See Fisher (1998) and Kyriazis and Economou (2013a) who provide 
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some demes. The agora, the “centre” of the city where most financial transactions 
were taking place was provided with new temples and law court facilities. In addition, 
new ship sheds for warships and an arsenal for naval stores were constructed at 
Piraeus. City walls were modernized and enhanced. Finally, a new Panathenaic 
stadium indented for sport activities was constructed (Ober, 2008, pp. 68-69). 
Lycurgus followed his predecessor Eubulus doctrine to focus on 
“international” trade as a means of increasing public revenues. Thus, Lycurgus passed 
a commercial law, which allowed metics and perhaps even slaves to litigate over 
contracts on equal terms with citizens. Through enkteseis he also offered special 
grants to non-citizens to own real estate whereas some foreigners that were 
accustomed to overseas trade were granted full citizenship by special decrees of the 
assembly (Engen, 2010). The efficient exploitation of trade transactions was also 
guaranteed by the use of the navy so as to suppress piracy. For this purpose, a naval 
station was also established on the Adriatic sea (Ober, pp. 68-69).  
In addition, another way of increasing public revenues seems to have come 
from an increase of the sacred revenues. Revenues from temples are estimated to have 
been more than 2% of the annual state income (Papazarkadas, 2011). Finally, in 354/3 
BCE Lycurgus introduced more aggressive measures to safeguard the soundness of 
the highly-esteemed Athenian coins, the so called “Athenian owls”. He drastically 
took measures to face coin forgery. In the meantime, he introduced a massive new 
issue of money in the market (Ober, 2008, pp. 68-69). This may seem that except 
from of an extensive expansionary fiscal policy, Lycurgus also introduced for some 
period a parallel controlled monetary expansionary policy too. 
 The result of all these policies was that the economy in its totality prospered, 
trade, exports and GDP grew. The Athenian 4
th
 century economy showed modern 
characteristics in the sense of being probably the first economy ever in which the 
second and third sectors of the production (manufacture and services) contributed 
more to the total Gross Domestic Product and employment than the primary one 
(agriculture). Thus, the period 355-322 BCE must be regarded as a second Golden 
Age for Athens.
11
  
                                                                                                                                                                      
additional references. The Telesterion of Eleusis was a sanctuary, one of the primary centers of the 
Eleusinian Mysteries devoted to the goddesses Demeter and Persephone (Wilson, 2005). 
11
 A detailed estimation of sectorial GDP and employment contributions is offered by Halkos and 
Kyriazis (2010). 
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The total of 1200 talents revenue for the period of Lycurgus is impressive 
since it came from Athenian own sources, without contributions by allies. During the 
355-322 period, Athens did no more have an empire. However, the revenues being 
achieved were higher than the 1000 talents of Athens during the 440’s BCE in 
absolute terms, and roughly comparable in relative terms, taking into account a 
possible inflation.
12
  
However, we further argue that the achievements of the Athenian economy 
during 355-322 BCE were not only the result of the fiscal expansionary programs. 
They must be also attributed to the stable economic and political environment during 
this period, due to the peaceful grand strategy which was introduced by Eubulus and 
Lycurgus and due to the positive feedbacks to the economy because since at least the 
second half of the 5
th
 century BCE, in Athens (and many other Greek city-states) an 
efficient economic environment of institutions, such as property rights protection and 
banking services had gradually been established etc. 
Efficient banking services and granting of maritime and other types of loans 
were considered during the 4
th
 century as usual economic transactions, being 
performed in an efficient way (Amemiya, 2007; Cohen, 1973, 1997; Scheffold, 2010). 
There was civic and property rights protection, political rights protection, the right to 
speak freely and have your ideas and values being exposed openly without any kind 
of penalty, a kind of “political liberalism” if we interpret the Athenian society’s 
picture of the era through F. Hayek’s (1973) spectacles, as well as, a series of 
institutions which were beneficial to the city, such as enkteseis, through which, a 
citizen from another city-state, whose (mostly) commercial activities had favoured the 
Athenian city-state, could receive a grant, to become an Athenian citizen (Βurke, 
2010, p. 397; Engen, 2010, pp. 192-197).    
 Furthermore, based on the ancient sources, (Arist. Ethics E. 1942β, 14-17; 
Dem. Lacr. 39; Hyper, For Eux. 35) we learn that “nothing has more validity than its 
conditions, and nobody has the right to appeal to any law or decree, or anything else 
                                                          
12
 While for example a stonemason received a wage of one drachma per day for the working on the 
Acropolis building program, which was equal to the daily wage of a rower during the 5
th
 century, he 
would receive one and a half drachma during the second half of the 4
th
 century. For prices, wages etc. 
Loomis (1988) offers a detailed analysis as Burke (1985) and Humphreys (1985) for Lycurgus’s 
project. 
 
15 
 
against this written agreement”. Kyriazis (2007, p. 74) has argued that the Athenian 
courts were responsible for solving legal disputes concerning property rights and 
safeguarding among others, legal contracts of associations: We think that the binding 
of contracts is a pivotal element for achieving an efficient level of market economy 
transactions. Finally, these transactions were becoming easier since after 376 BCE, as 
it has been already mentioned earlier, Nicophon’s Law was introduced, according to 
which strict measures were taken to securitise that the coins which were used in 
financial transactions were “pure” and trustworthy, so that transactions took place fair 
and fast for both sides (Engen, 2005; Ober, 2008). 
 
Table 3: Institutional and political change in ancient Athens 
Political Decision 
Year(s) of 
introduction 
Initiator New Institutions and policies 
Political 
change 
Naval Law 
(482/481) 
 
Themistocles 
(“politician”) 
Trierarchy 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) 
Full political 
rights to all 
citizens 
theorika 
 
(460-450 
approximately) 
 
Pericles 
(“politician”) 
Payment for public service and for 
theatre plays 
 
graphe paranomon 
 
(415-403) 
 
? Less radical democracy 
Constitutional 
legal 
procedure 
Nicophon’s monetaty law 
 
(376) 
 
Nicophon 
(“businessman”) 
Monetary law: 
Parallel circulation of all good coins 
 
1.) Expansionary fiscal 
policy 
2.) Trade increase policy 
 
(354) 
Eubulus 
(“politician”) 
Increased theorika payments 
Extensive public works program 
Nicophon’s law is improved 
 
Peace grand 
strategy 
 
1.) Expansionary fiscal 
policy 
2.) Trade increase policy 
3.) Nicophon’s law is 
improved 
(338) 
Lycurgus 
(“politician”) 
 
Eisphora also in peacetime 
Extensive public works program 
Trade increase policy 
(commesial law, 
Enkteseis) 
 
Peace grand 
strategy 
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Finally, in the Athenian economy and society women too had the right to run 
business activities such as fashion houses, even banking services etc. (Halkos and 
Κyriazis, 2010; Kyriazis, 2012, pp. 74-76). Finally, slaves were in an undeniably 
better social status compared, say, with slaves in Sparta or in Rome in later historical 
times. Slaves in Athens could not be tortured, killed. They could not be punished 
without judicial sentence. Slaves had some “minimal” rights to exercise, such as to 
participate with their families in some aspects of social life, such as religious events, 
for example, during the preliminary phases of the famous “Eleusinian Mysteries”, or 
to participate in symposia such as the so-called Hoes during the Anthestiria festival. 
Slaves could also acquire property and through it, even to buy their freedom, thus to 
become citizens with full political rights, like the case of the famous banker Pasion 
(Isocr. Pan 18.1; Cohen, 2000, pp. 132-145; Kyriazis, 2012, pp. 72-73). 
Table 3 illustrates a few important institutional changes. It presents a series of 
key decisions that were decided by the Athenian citizens, for example the Naval 
Decree of 482-481 BC, its initiator Themistocles, and the positive feedbacks that that 
these decisions had on introducing new institutions and political change.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this essay, we have analysed, at first, a model of choice set in order to argue 
that the Athenian democracy was a political society of “flexible” citizens, with the 
meaning of being receptive and adaptable to new ideas, values and principles. Such a 
condition was the result of an emerging democratic macroculture, as Kyriazis and 
Economou (2013a) have argued.  
Next, we analysed through two simple games, how and under what terms 
peace strategy is beneficial for (at least) the majority of citizens in a society, whereas, 
then we interpreted the implementation of such a peace strategy in the Athenian 
democracy during 355-322 BCE as the final outcome of such an “exchange”: the 
majority of the Athenian people, decided to abandon war in favour of a peace grand 
strategy, through the establishment of two high scale extensive public works, that 
could be characterized as of Keynesian inspiration in an modern sense.  
The programs of Eubulus and Lycurgus balanced out the various contradictory 
interests through the introduction of compensatory payments by the rich to the poor to 
convince them to change preferences, thus bringing about a Pareto better outcome for 
the society as a whole and in the sense that the real preferences of the majority of the 
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voters were revealed and then adopted through the voting process by the Athenian 
Assembly.  
We think that Eubulus and Lycurgus fiscal expansionary policies amplified 
citizens’ trust in the Athenian political regime and democratic institutions. By 
participating in a political system that was taking into account their individual 
preferences, the Athenian citizens had the will and the motives to defend it from any 
possible future collapse. Our idea that a political system survives when citizens as 
individuals wish as a total to defend it can also be found within the key findings of 
Weingast (1997) who examined the political foundations of democracy in 
seventeenth-century England, after the Glorious Revolution of 1688.  
The public works implemented by Eubulus and Lycurgus disclose also another 
diastasis when comparing ancient to modern democracies: in a direct democracy the 
problem of revealing the actual preferences of citizens on particular issues and in real 
time can be efficiently managed under certain circumstances whereas in a 
representative democracy fails to do so, because under it, citizens-voters have to 
decide upon a “bundle” of all-encompassing proposals made by each political party, 
without having the possibility to decide upon separate issues. 
Finally, we conclude with some ideas as to the future of today’s Europe. We 
argue that the ancient Athenian paradigm of the 355-322 BCE period might offer 
some argumentation in favour of those policymakers and scholars such as Galbraith 
(2008), who argue that public investment in infrastructure and social welfare policies 
must increase within the European Union (EU), and should, at least partially, replace 
excessive austerity measures throughout Europe, because so far, austerity measures 
have finally lead to the decline of the EU GDP in the long run.  
Austerity measures, even having been necessary in some respects for 
restructuring a deregulated economy, such as the Greek economy after the debt crisis 
of 2010, cannot be acceptable forever. We fear that a “EU solidarity in austerity” will 
finally lead to the de-legitimisation of the EU’s goals and policies in the eyes of its 
constituents throughout Europe. Thus, in such cases governments should actively 
participate in the recovery of economies in decline, by perhaps, introducing policies 
of social welfare in favour of low income citizens, or alternatively introducing public 
investments, under the aegis of the EU budget.    
We do hope that with this essay, we contribute to the ongoing research 
globally, as far as issues which connect democracy and economy are concerned, with 
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a paradigm from ancient Greece, where the first ever functional recorded democracies 
ever recorded: Democracy in order to flourish and have its positive outcomes for a 
society to emerge as an “invisible hand”, requires political stability and strong 
economic institutions.  
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